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Becker: Calculation of Time Credits for Texas Prisoners.

CALCULATION OF TIME CREDITS FOR TEXAS
PRISONERS
DEBORAH A. BECKER

Little is more important to a prisoner than the date of his ultimate
release from incarceration. This concern and the complexity of the applicable law have contributed to the amount of litigation in the area of time

credits. The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides some guidelines
for the determination of time credits.' The code is supplemented by federal
and state case law interpreting the statute, and filling gaps left by the

legislature.2 More specifically, the determination of time credits has been
left to the courts in cases involving premature release, re-sentencing, and
multiple jurisdictions. 3 Perhaps because the courts retain a certain amount
of discretion in these areas, the decisions reflect some inconsistencies.
Flat time, or jail time, means actual calendar days from the beginning
of incarceration.' "Good time" is commonly referred to as time off for good
behavior, which is an accurate description. Separate statutes govern the

determination of good time credits for felons and misdemeanants.1 The
stated purpose of each statute is to encourage discipline and to reward
those prisoners who are "orderly, industrious and obedient," by commuting their sentences Commutation is granted to misdemeanants by the
1. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 42.03 (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977).

2. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 718-19 (1969); Pruett v. Texas, 468
F.2d 51, 55 (5th Cir. 1972), aff'd and modified in part, 470 F.2d 1182 (rehearing en banc),
aff'd, 414 U.S. 802 (1973); Robinson v. Beto, 426 F.2d 797, 798 (5th Cir. 1970). See generally
H. HOFFMAN, PRISONERS' RIGHTS 9-1 to 9-41 (1976); H. KERPER & J. KERPER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF
THE CONVICTED 180-89 (1974).
3. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 718-19 (1969) (re-sentencing); Ex
parte Jasper, 538 S.W.2d 782, 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (multiple jurisdictions); Ex parte
Downey, 471 S.W.2d 576, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (premature release).
4. See Ex parte Bates, 538 S.W.2d 790, 792-93 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Ex parte Jasper,
538 S.W.2d 782, 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
5. Compare TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 61841 (Vernon 1970) (felons) with id. art.
5118a (Vernon 1971) (misdemeanants).
6. Id. art. 5118a (Vernon 1971) & art. 61841 (Vernon 1970); see Ex parte Boyd, 152 Tex.
Crim. 164, 166, 212 S.W.2d 156, 157-58 (1948).
7. Felons are classified by the Director of Corrections into one of three classes, according
to their conduct. Prisoners in Class I receive twenty days per month deduction, therefore, for
every thirty days served the prisoner receives credit for fifty days. See Ex parte Anderson,
149 Tex. Crim. 139, 142, 192 S.W.2d 280, 282 (1946); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 61841
(Vernon 1970). Prisoners in Class II receive ten days per month good time credit, and those
in Class IIl receive none. State-approved trusties-model prisoners with special responsibilities and privileges-receive a deduction of thirty days per month served. TEx. REv. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 61841 (Vernon 1970).
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sheriff of the county where the prisoner is detained, and to felons by the
director of the Prison Board.8 In either case, commutation must be earned
by the prisoner;' it is not a vested right 0 and may be forfeited if prison
regulations are violated." The forfeiture of good time credits is within the
discretion of the sheriff or the disciplinary committee.
A distinction must be made between the actual granting of good time
credit and mandatory consideration for good time credit. The director of
the Texas Department of Corrections has exclusive authority to grant good
time credit to a convicted felon. 3 A court, therefore, may require only that
the director consider a particular prisoner for good time credit." This limitation on judicial authority is consistent with the purpose behind allowing
credit, that of encouraging good conduct." Good time credit is not a gratuitous benefit, but an earned privilege, and can only be granted when the
Texas Department of Corrections has investigated the conduct of a prisoner. 6
DEVELOPMENT OF CURRENT STATUTORY LAW

The statutes prescribing the procedural requirements for allocating good
time credits also set forth guidelines for determination of credits earned
prior to sentencing, or prior to transfer to the Texas Department of Corrections in the case of a felony conviction. 7 One statute, article 42.03 of the
8. Tzx. Rv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5118a (Vernon 1971) (misdemeanants) & art. 61841
(Vernon 1970) (felons).
9. Ex parte Anderson, 149 Tex. Crim. 139, 142, 192 S.W.2d 280, 282 (1946).
10. Ex parte Boyd, 152 Tex. Crim. 164, 166, 212 S.W.2d 156, 158 (1948).
11. Tex. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5118a (Vernon 1971) & art. 61841 (Vernon 1970).
12. Tzx. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5118a (Vernon 1971) (misdemeanants) & art. 61841
(Vernon 1970) (felons); see Ex parte Sanderson, 152 Tex. Crim. 180, 184, 212 S.W.2d 639,
642 (1948). In Ex parte Boyd, 152 Tex. Crim. 164, 212 S.W.2d 156 (1948), the defendant was
in prison on fourteen concurrent felony convictions. He broke the prison rules by possessing
seventy tubes of benzidine and by breaking into the locker of another inmate to steal some
watches. The court upheld the forfeiture of good time credit and transfer from Class I to Class
III status, per art. 61841. Id. at 165, 212 S.W.2d at 157. The prisoner in Ex parte Sanderson,
152 Tex. Crim. 180, 212 S.W.2d 639 (1948) escaped and all good time was forfeited. Id. at
184, 212 S.W.2d at 642.
13. Gardner v. State, 542 S.W.2d 127, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Laue v. State, 491
S.W.2d 403, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Tzx. R v. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 61841 (Vernon 1970).
14. See Gardner v. State, 542 S.W.2d 127, 130-31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
15. See Ex parte Boyd, 152 Tex. Crim. 164, 166, 212 S.W.2d 156, 157-58 (1948); Tax.
REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 61841 (Vernon 1970).
16. See Gardner v. State, 542 S.W.2d 127, 130-31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). Presumably,
the same reasoning applies to misdemeanants as to felons.
17. Tax. CODE CiuM. PRO. ANN. art. 42.03 (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977), in pertinent part,
provides:
Sec. 2. In all criminal cases the judge of the court in which the defendant was
convicted shall give the defendant credit on his sentence for the time that the defendant has spent in jail in said cause, from the time of his arrest and confinement until
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Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, has been amended recently in order to
conform with federal constitutional requirements."
Pre-SentenceFlat Time
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that there is no
federal constitutional right to credit for time served prior to sentence."
There is, however, an important exception to this holding. A criminal
defendant who, because of his indigency, is prevented from making bond
and who is sentenced to the statutory maximum for his particular offense,
is entitled to credit for pre-sentence time in jail." This exception is required by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment since
the maximum sentence for any substantive offense must be the same for
all defendants.' An indigent may not, therefore, be required to serve the
maximum sentence in addition to his pre-sentence time, while his wealthhis sentence by the trial court.
Sec. 3. If a defendant appeals his conviction, is not released on bail, and is retained
in a local jail as provided in Section 5, Article 42.09, pending his appeal, the judge of
the court in which the defendant was convicted shall give the defendant credit on his
sentence for the time that the defendant has spent in jail pending disposition of his
appeal....
Sec. 4. When a defendant who has been sentenced to imprisonment in the Department of Corrections has spent time in jail pending trial and sentence or pending
appeal, the judge of the sentencing court shall direct the sheriff to attach to the
commitment papers a statement assessing the defendant's conduct while in jail. On
the basis of the statement, the Department of Corrections shall grant the defendant
such credit for good behavior for the time spent in jail as he would have earned had
he been in the custody of the department.
18. See Pruett v. Texas, 468 F.2d 51, 55 (5th Cir. 1972), aff'd and modified in part, 470
F.2d 1182 (rehearing en banc), afl'd, 414 U.S. 802 (1973); Robinson v. Beto, 426 F.2d 797,
798 (5th Cir. 1970). A state prisoner's entry into federal court is by writ of habeas corpus when
he is challenging time credits allowed him. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973).
The prisoner must, however, exhaust his remedies in the state courts before the federal courts
will intervene on writ of habeas corpus. Garza v. Texas, 474 F.2d 905, 906 (5th Cir. 1973); 28
U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1970).
19. Jackson v. Alabama, 530 F.2d 1231, 1237 (5th Cir. 1976); Gremillion v. Henderson,
425 F.2d 1293, 1294 (5th Cir. 1970). In Cobb v. Bailey, 469 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1972) the court
noted that Congress had passed legislation requiring the crediting of pre-sentence time, and
stated, "lalpparently such credit was not viewed as an absolute Constitutional right. If it
were, then there would have been no necessity for the legislation." Id. at 1070; cf. McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 277 (1973) (upholding New York statute disallowing good time
credit for pre-sentence time against equal protection argument). But see Durkin v. Davis, 538
F.2d 1037, 1039-40 (4th Cir. 1976).
20. Martin v. Florida, 533 F.2d 270, 271 (5th Cir. 1976); Jackson v. Alabama, 530 F.2d
1231, 1237 (5th Cir. 1976); accord, Caraway v. State, 550 S.W.2d 699, 704 (Tex. Crim. App.
1977); see Hill v. Wainwright, 465 F.2d 414, 415 (5th Cir. 1972); Hart v. Henderson, 449 F.2d
183, 185 (5th Cir. 1971).
21. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398-99 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 244

(1970).
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ier counterpart serves less total time because he is able to secure bail prior
to sentencing. On the other hand, a presumption arises that credit was
given for pre-sentence time if the defendant's total jail time is less than
22
the maximum allowable for the offense.
In the past, Texas followed the Fifth Circuit, leaving pre-sentence credit
to the discretion of the trial judge." The court of criminal appeals found
the Texas statutes to be constitutional, reasoning that pre-sentence confinement was not punishment, but merely a method of insuring the defendant's appearance at his trial.2" In 1973 article 42.03 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure was amended to require that credit be given for presentence time spent in jail.2 The adoption of this amendment reflected the
growing trend across the country in favor of allowing credit for pre-sentence
time. The change was not made retroactive, however, 27 and was attacked
on that basis as an unconstitutional denial of equal protection.28 The Fifth
Circuit upheld the non-retroactive application of the statute, finding that
since pre-sentence credit is not a constitutional right, the state had simply
conferred a benefit.2 The court based its holding upon a previous interpre22. Parker v. Estelle, 498 F.2d 625, 627 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
23. See, e.g., Ex parte Allen, 548 S.W.2d 905, 907 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Ex parte
Freeman, 486 S.W.2d 556, 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 722, § 1, at
485 (current version at TEx. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 42.03, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977)).
24. Bennett v. State, 450 S.W.2d 652, 657 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970). One commentator
indicated that the reasoning in Bennett was "worthy of the combined wits of the Red Queen
and Colonel Cathcart ....
Like Alice, one gets the feeling there's something wrong here
somewhere." Schornhorst, Presentence Confinement and the Constitution: The Burial of
Dead Time, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 1041, 1067-68 (1972).
25. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 42.03, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977).
26. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1970) (pre-sentence credit mandatory); MASS. GEN. LAwS
ANN. ch. 279, § 33A (1968) (pre-sentence credit mandatory). See generally Berger, Equal
Protectionand Criminal Sentencing: Legal and Policy Considerations, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 29
(1976); Schornhorst, Presentence Confinement and the Constitution: The Burial of Dead
Time, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 1041 (1972); Note, Sentence Crediting For The State CriminalDefendanf-A ConstitutionalRequirement, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 586 (1973); Comment, Presentence
Custody Time Under California Penal Code Section 2900.5, 3 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 157 (1975);
Comment, Credit for Time Served Between Arrest and Sentencing, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1148
(1973). The A.B.A. STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3.6(a),
at 363 (1974), quoted in Durkin v. Davis, 538 F.2d 1037, 1038 n.1 (4th Cir. 1976), provide:
Credit against the maximum term and any minimum term should be given to a
defendant for all time spent in custody as a result of the criminal charge for which a
prison sentence is imposed or as a result of the conduct on which such a charge is based.
This should specifically include credit for time spent in custody prior to trial, during
trial, pending sentence, pending the resolution of an appeal, and prior to arrival at the
institution to which the defendant has been committed.
27. See Harrelson v. State, 511 S.W.2d 957, 958 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
28. See Franks v. Estelle, 543 F.2d 567, 568 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1561
(1977).
29. See id. at 568; Jackson v. Alabama, 530 F.2d 1231, 1238 (5th Cir. 1976). Contra,.In
re Kapperman, 522 P.2d 657, 659-62, 114 Cal. Rptr. 97, 99-102 (1974) (en banc). The Califor-
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tation of a similar statute in Alabama, wherein the court found that a
recalculation of credits would be an administrative burden outweighing
the inequities resulting from prospective application of the statute.' A
recalculation of these credits would not seem to present an impossible task
since all that would be required is a simple mathematical computation of
flat time credits for the affected prisoners.3 The information necessary for
this computation should be readily available in the prisoner's records.
Time in Jail Pending Appeal
The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure now provides mandatory credit
for time spent in jail pending appeal.32 Under prior Texas law, allowance
of credit for time spent in jail pending appeal was discretionary with the
trial judge. 33 The Fifth Circuit held this procedure to be a violation of due
process requirements in Robinson v. Beto. 3'
The Robinson court held that once a right of appeal had been established
by a state, due process required that a defendant's exercise of that right
could not be unreasonably impeded.3 5 The court reasoned that those defendants who chose to appeal their convictions ran the risk of longer imprisonment because the judge could choose not to credit them with custodial
time pending appeal. 3 Threatened with the loss of that time, a prisoner
nia Supreme Court held that a similar non-retroactive provision was a denial of equal protection as a legislative classification which was not supported by a rational and legitimate state
interest. Id. at 659-62, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 99-102. See generally 15 SArA CLARA LAW. 223 (1974).
30. Franks v. Estelle, 543 F.2d 567, 568 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1561
(1977); see Jackson v. Alabama, 530 F.2d 1231, 1238 (5th Cir. 1976).
31. Cf. Allen v. Henderson, 434 F.2d 26, 28 (5th Cir. 1970) (requiring retroactive application of North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) since only mathematical computation
of time credits required). The "effect on the administration of justice" is one of the criteria
for determining whether a statute should have retroactive or prospective effect. See Stovall
v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967). For a general introduction to this area, see Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Ostrager, Retroactivity and Prospectivity of Supreme Court
ConstitutionalInterpretations, 19 N.Y.L.F. 289 (1973); Note, Retroactivity of Criminal Procedure Decisions, 55 IOWA L. REv. 1309 (1970); 5 UNIV. RICH. L. REv. 129 (1970).
32. TEx. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 42.03, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977).
33. See 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 659, § 28 at 1743 (current version at TEx. CODE CRIM.
PRO. ANN. art. 42.03, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977)).
34. 426 F.2d 797, 798 (5th Cir. 1970). The fourteenth amendment due process clause
insures that "action by a state through any of its agencies must be consistent with the
... Buchalter v. New York, 319 U.S. 427,
fundamental principles of liberty and justice.
429 (1943). The due process clause exacts from the states "a conception of fundamental
justice." Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 136 (1947).
35. Robinson v. Beto, 426 F.2d 797, 798 (5th Cir. 1970). See also North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724 (1969). "Due process requires that a state, once it establishes
avenues of appellate review, must keep those avenues free of unreasoned distinctions that
A defendant's right of appeal must be free
impede open and equal access to the courts ....
and unfettered." Robinson v. Beto, 426 F.2d 797, 798 (5th Cir. 1970).
36. Robinson v. Beto, 426 F.2d 797, 799 (5th Cir. 1970).
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might be discouraged from appealing. 7 This criticism was especially valid
since the prior statute had been construed to mean that the trial judge had
exclusive authority to allow credit for time pending appeal'
Good time credits
Both case law and the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure now require
good time consideration for all time-including pre-sentence time and
time pending appeal-spent in detention prior to transfer to the Texas
Department of Corrections. 9 The Fifth Circuit's decision in Pruett v.
Texas5 extended the Robinson holding to include mandatory consideration
for good time credits for time in jail pending appeal." The court held that
while neither of the good time statutes"2 alone was unconstitutional, their
enforcement together constituted a denial of equal protection. 3 When the
statutes were read together, all misdemeanants, and those felons who did
not appeal, received good time credit for all the time they spent in jail."
Felons who appealed, however, did not receive good time credit for time
37. Id. at 799. See also North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724 (1969).
38. See, e.g., Vessels v. State, 467 S.W.2d 259, 264 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (judge on
remand had no such authority); Ex parte Washburn, 459 S.W.2d 637, 639. (Tex. Crim. App.
1970) (habeas corpus judge had no such authority); Holcombe v. State, 448 S.W.2d 493, 493
(Tex. Crim. App. 1970) (court of criminal appeals had no such authority).
39. See Pruett v. Texas, 468 F.2d 51, 53-55 (5th Cir. 1972), aff'd and modified in part,
470 F.2d 1182 (rehearing en banc), aff'd, 414 U.S. 802 (1973); TEx. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN.
art. 42.03, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977).
40. 468 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1972), aff'd and modified in part, 470 F.2d 1182 (rehearing en
banc), alV'd, 414 U.S. 802 (1973). See generally 51 TEXAS L. REv. 348 (1973).
41. Pruett v. Texas, 468 F.2d 51, 53-55 (5th Cir. 1972), affd and modified in part, 470
F.2d 1182 (rehearing en banc), aff'd, 414 U.S. 802 (1973).
42. TEx. Rav. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5118a (Vernon 1971) & art. 61841 (Vernon 1970).
43. Pruett v. Texas, 468 F.2d 51, 55 (5th Cir. 1972), aff'd and modified in part, 470 F.2d
1182 (rehearing en banc), aff'd, 414 U.S. 802 (1973). See also North Carolina v. Pearce, 395
U.S. 711, 718-19, 719 n.13 (1969); Ex parte Bennett, 508 S.W.2d 646, 647 (Tex. Crim. App.
1974). In McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973) the Supreme Court upheld a New York
statute disallowing good time credit for pre-sentence time. The Court held that in order to
justify a distinction between treatment of prisoners in the application of good time credits in
the face of an equal protection challenge, the only question was "whether the challenged
distinction rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose." d. at 270. In
McGinnis the state purpose was to reward a prisoner's rehabilitative efforts, and since the
county jails had no significant rehabilitation program, the denial of good time credits for time
in the county jails prior to sentence was not a denial of equal protection. d. at 270-77. Justice
Douglas, dissenting, considered the place of a prisoner's confinement to be irrelevant since
the inducement of good behavior was the real purpose for good time credits. Id. at 278
(Douglas, J., dissenting). The Texas legislature evidently found the arguments of the Fifth
Circuit and Justice Douglas the more persuasive in enacting article 42.03. See TEx. CODE
Cam. PRO. ANN. art. 42.03, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977).
44. See Pruett v. Texas, 468 F.2d 51, 55 (5th Cir. 1972), af'd and modified in part, 470
F.2d 1182 (rehearing en banc), af'd, 414 U.S. 802 (1973).
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pending appeal, and were effectively punished for exercising their right to
appeal.' 5

On rehearing in the Pruett case, the Fifth Circuit reluctantly concluded
that the decision should have only prospective effect." The court found
that the Texas Department of Corrections would be unable to comply
effectively with a retroactive order since inadequate records relating to
behavior had been kept on felons in the county jails.'7 While the statute
requiring mandatory flat time credit for pre-sentence time should have
retroactive effect,"8 the same reasoning does not apply when good time
credits are involved. Flat time credit may be determined by a simple
calculation of actual time spent in jail. The determination of good time
credits, on the other hand, is based on a review of the prisoner's conduct
while in jail and more extensive recordkeeping is required." The Fifth
Circuit would therefore seem to be justified in not giving Pruett retroactive
effect to the Pruett decision.
COMMON SrrUATIONs NOT COvERED BY STATUTE

The Texas statutes now require flat time credit, and consideration for
good time credit, for all time spent in custody under normal circumstances." The courts retain a certain amount of discretion, however, in recur-

ring problem areas not specifically treated by the statutes. When a prisoner is prematurely released, re-sentenced, or involved in offenses in multiple jurisdictions, a suit disputing the determination of his time credits
frequently follows.
PrematureRelease
There are many combinations of circumstances which have resulted in
the release of a prisoner before he has served his full sentence, including
escape,"' probation or parole,52 clerical error,1 failure of one jurisdiction to
45. See id. at 55; Robinson v. Beto, 426 F.2d 797, 798 (5th Cir. 1970).
46. Pruett v. Texas, 470 F.2d 1182, 1184 (5th Cir.) (rehearing en banc), alf'd, 414 U.S.
802 (1973).
47. Id. at 1184.
48. See notes 25-28 supra and accompanying text.
49. See Pruett v. Texas, 470 F.2d 1182, 1184 (5th Cir.) (rehearing en banc), afl'd, 414
U.S. 802 (1973). In at least one case where adequate records had been kept, a federal district
judge held that since the reasoning in Pruett did not apply, the holding should not either.
Good time credit was granted for the time spent in jail pending appeal. Kane v. Texas, 388
F. Supp. 1188, 1189 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
50. See Tax. CODE CraM. PRO. ANN. art. 42.03 (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977).
51. See Ex parte Partridge, 161 Tex. Crim. 185, 188, 275 S.W.2d 682, 684 (1955).
52. See Tex. CODE CRIM. PRo. ANN. art. 42.12 (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977). If a prisoner's
valid probation or parole is revoked, he receives no credit for the time spent out of jail. Id.
art. 42.12 §§ 8(b), 22; see, e.g., Quintero v. State, 469 S.W.2d 189, 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971)
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promptly claim the prisoner from another jurisdiction," and even invalid
agreements between the authorities and the prisoner to postpone service
of sentence.55 Two lines of reasoning have developed in the federal courts
for determining flat time credits for a prisoner who has been prematurely
released." The basic premise underlying both theories is that it is a denial
of due process to require a prisoner to serve his sentence in installments if
he was not at fault in obtaining his early release."
In Shields v. Beto58 a Texas prisoner was extradited to Louisiana. Texas
placed no detainer on the prisoner and did not claim him when he was
released by the Louisiana authorities after serving his Louisiana sentence.
Twenty-eight years later, Texas authorities arrested the prisoner to require
him to serve the remainder of his Texas sentence. The court held that
Texas had waived jurisdiction over the prisoner by failing to reclaim him,
and that it would be a denial of due process to require the defendant to
serve out his sentence after such a lapse of time."9 This "waiver theory"
sounds in estoppel; the courts have reasoned that a prisoner should be able
to depend on the action or inaction of the state in claiming him."0 The end
result in a case where the waiver theory is applied is the unconditional
release of the prisoner,' thereby obviating the need to make a determination of time credits earned.
The second line of reasoningthe "credit theory," originated in 1930 with
2 In White the prisoner was released
White v. Pearlman."
due to a clerical
(probation); DeLeon v. State, 466 S.W.2d 573, 576 (1971) (probation); Ex parte Sellars, 384
S.W.2d 351, 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964) (parole).
53. See, e.g., White v. Pearlman, 42 F.2d 788, 789 (10th Cir. 1930); Ex parte Bates, 538
S.W.2d 790, 793 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Ex parte Esquivel, 531 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1976). In each of these cases, the prison records did not reflect the correct sentence.
54. See Shields v. Beto, 370 F.2d 1003, 1005-06 (5th Cir. 1967).
55. See, e.g., Moneyhun v. State, 161 Tex. Crim. 19, 20, 274 S.W.2d 546, 547 (1955)
(agreement with judge); Ex parte Morgan, 159 Tex. Crim. 241, 245, 262 S.W.2d 728, 730
(1953) (agreement with sheriff); Ex parte Wyatt, 29 Tex. Crim. 398, 400, 16 S.W. 301, 301
(1891) (agreement with sheriff).
56. Compare Shields v. Beto, 370 F.2d 1003, 1005-06 (5th Cir. 1967) with White v.
Pearlman, 42 F.2d 788, 789 (10th Cir. 1930).
57. See Shields v. Beto, 370 F.2d 1003, 1005-06 (5th Cir. 1967); White v. Pearlman, 42
F.2d 788, 789 (10th Cir. 1930).
58. 370 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1967).
59. Id. at 1005-06.
60. See Lanier v. Williams, 361 F. Supp. 944, 945 (E.D.N.C. 1973). See also Bailey v.
Ciccone, 420 F. Supp. 344, 347 (W.D. Mo. 1976). The waiver theory was narrowed in Piper v.
Estelle, 485 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1973) to apply only to those cases where the state was grossly
negligent in failing to claim its prisoner. Id. at 246. "Shields v. Beto was not intended to
constitute a trap for unwary state officials." Id. at 246.
61. See Shields v. Beto, 370 F.2d 1003, 1005-06 (5th. Cir. 1967); Lanier v. Williams, 361
F. Supp. 944, 947-48 (E.D.N.C. 1973). See generally Piper v. Estelle, 485 F.2d 245, 246 (5th
Cir. 1973).
62. 42 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1930).
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error, and the court held that since the release was not due to escape,
violation of parole, or the fault of the prisoner, he could not be made to
serve his sentence in installments and should receive flat time credit for
the time he was out of jail. 3 In applying the credit theory, the key determination in each case is what constitutes "fault."'" Additionally, in certain
cases, the prisoner may be required to take affirmative action to see that
he serves his sentence. 5
Instead of the unconditional release of the prisoner which is achieved
when the waiver theory is applied, the prisoner under the credit theory
merely receives credit for the time he was out of jail. Of course, if the entire
term of his sentence has run while the prisoner was free, he will be released."6 In any event, while he may receive flat time credit, he cannot
receive good time credit for the time out of custody, even if he was not at
fault.67 Allowing good time credit for time not spent in custody would
contravene the clearly stated legislative purpose of encouraging good behavior while in custody.6
63. Id. at 789. See also Cox v. United States, 551 F.2d 1096, 1099 (7th Cir. 1977); Lanier
v. Williams, 361 F. Supp. 944, 947 (E.D.N.C. 1973). In White v. Pearlman, 42 F.2d 788 (10th
Cir. 1930), the court held:
A prisoner has some rights. A sentence of five years means a continuous sentence,
unless interrupted by escape, violation of parole, or some fault of the prisoner, and he
cannot be required to serve it in installments. Certainly a prisoner should have his
chance to re-establish himself and live down his past. Yet, under the strict rule contended for by the warden, a prisoner sentenced to five years might be released in a year;
picked up a year later to serve three months, and so on ad libitum, with the result that
he is left without even a hope of beating his way back. It is our conclusion that where
a prisoner is discharged from a penal institution, without any contributing fault on his
part, and without violation of conditions of parole, that his sentence continues to run
while he is at liberty.
Id. at 789. Texas has adopted the rationale of the White decision. Ex parte Downey, 471
S.W.2d 576, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
64. See, e.g., Ex parte Bates, 538 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (clerical error
not defendant's fault); Ex parte Partridge, 161 Tex. Crim. 185, 188, 275 S.W.2d 682, 684
(1955) (escape was defendant's fault); Moneyhun v. State, 161 Tex. Crim. 19, 20, 274 S.W.2d
546, 547 (1955) (agreement between sheriff and prisoner was defendant's fault).
65. See Ex parte Francis, 510 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Ex parte Rayburn, 146 Tex. Crim. 204, 205-06, 172 S.W.2d 505, 506 (1943). In each of these cases the
defendant failed to present himself to the convicting court after his conviction was affirmed
on appeal because no one contacted him. In Rayburn, the defendant actually presented
himself at the penitentiary, but was denied admittance because his papers were not in order.
Id. at 205-06, 172 S.W.2d at 506. In both cases the court held that the defendant was at fault
for failure to comply with the terms of his appeal bond, requiring that he present himself to
the convicting court. Ex parte Francis, 510 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Ex parte
Rayburn, 146 Tex. Crim. 204, 205-06, 172 S.W.2d 505, 506 (1943).
66. See Ex parte Morgan, 159 Tex. Crim. 241, 245, 262 S.W.2d 728, 730 (1953).
67. Ex parte Bates, 538 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); see Ex parte Esquivel,
531 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
68. See Ex parte Boyd, 152 Tex. Crim. 164, 166, 212 S.W.2d 156, 157-58 (1948); TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5118a (Vernon 1971) & art. 61841 (Vernon 1970).
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Credit for Time Served on a Void Judgment"
Until 1969, a prisoner in Texas received no credit for time spent in jail
on a void judgment."' The court of criminal appeals in Ex parte Ferrell7
recognized that due process problems might exist, but refrained from
amending its policy for reasons peculiar to that case." The United States
Supreme Court, in North Carolina v. Pearce," settled the due process
questions in 1969 by holding that, when re-sentencing for the same offense,
the failure to credit time already served was a violation of the double
jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment.' The Court also indicated that a
prisoner should be given the benefit of any good time credits which had
been earned.7 5
The Pearce decision has been applied retroactively by the Fifth Circuit,
which reasoned that only a simple mathematical computation of time
earned under the void sentence would be required to determine credit.7
Presumably, good time earned in the Texas Department of Corrections
could also be easily calculated, since records would have been kept of
conduct during the void sentence just like any other sentence. Retroactive
application of Pearce in this instance would not, therefore, present the
problems which would have been encountered in a similar application of
69. The term "void" is used here to describe a judgment which has been reversed or set
aside, for whatever reason, with the result that the prisoner is re.sentenced.
70. See Ex parte Nations, 164 Tex. Crim. 611, 612, 301 S.W.2d 675, 676 (1957); Ogle v.
State, 43 Tex. Crim. 219, 233, 63 S.W. 1009, 1013 (1901). In Ogle, the prisoner served seventeen years on his first sentence for which he received no credit, although his second sentence
was much lower than the first. Id. at 233, 63 S.W. at 1013.
71. 406 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966).
72. Id. at 443. In this case the defendant received a sentence of life imprisonment. He
challenged this sentence in a federal habeas corpus proceeding on the ground that his attorney
was not present at sentencing. The federal court ordered that he be released unless he was
re-sentenced. Ferrell was re-sentenced to life, but this judgment was reformed to ten years
by the court of criminal appeals. In a subsequent habeas corpus proceeding, Ferrell requested
and was denied credit for the time he served under the original sentence. On a motion to
consolidate, the court recognized that due process problems might exist in denial of credit,
but refused to remedy the situation because it had decided that Ferrell really should have
had to serve the original life sentence. Id. at 441-43. This case is a procedural jungle and is
noteworthy only in that the court, after sixty-five years, began to perceive the unfairness of
this doctrine.
73. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
74. Id. at 718-19. "[Tlhe constitutional guarantees against multiple punishments for
the same offense absolutely requires that punishment already exacted must be fully 'credited'
in imposing sentence upon a new conviction for the same offense." Id. at 718-19. On the same
day Pearce was decided, the Supreme Court held that the double jeopardy clause of the fifth
amendment applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
75. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 719 n.13 (1969).
76. See Allen v. Henderson, 434 F.2d 26, 28 (5th Cir. 1970).
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the Pruett v. Texas" decision.78
In keeping with their decisions holding that credit for pre-sentence time
is not constitutionally mandated, 7' the Fifth Circuit and the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals .have refused to apply Pearce to pre-sentence time.10
The court of criminal appeals has held that if pre-sentence credit was not
granted in a case decided under the discretionary statute, such credit is
not required by Pearce.8' Since credit for time spent in jail pending appeal
is a constitutional requirement,"2 however, it should be allowed for such
time on re-sentencing.
The result of Pearce and its progeny is that, on re-sentencing, a Texas
prisoner will receive credit for all the time spent in jail pursuant to his
original sentence. Additionally, he will receive credit for pre-sentence time
if he was originally sentenced under the current Code of Criminal Proce,
dure, or if pre-sentence credit was granted by the judge under the old
discretionary statute.Y If pre-sentence credit was denied under the discretionary statute, Pearcedoes not require that it be given on re-sentencing.Y
A situation analogous to the void sentence problem arises when a prisoner's death sentence is commuted to life-he is in effect re-sentenced. The
importance of determining flat time and good time credits for prisoners
with life sentences is in the computation of their parole eligibility dates.,
The court of criminal appeals has held that individuals with death sentences which are commuted to life are entitled to flat time and consideration for good time credits for time spent in prison since the date of their
admission," as well as credit for time spent in jail pending appeal." Presentence time and good time credit for time in jail pending appeal would
depend on the law in effect at the time of sentencing."
77. 468 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1972), a/f'd and modified in part, 470 F.2d 1182 (rehearing en
banc), aff'd, 414 U.S. 802 (1973).
78. See Pruett v. Texas, 470 F.2d 1182, 1184 (5th Cir.) (rehearing en banc), affVd 414
U.S. 802 (1973). See also notes 44-47 supra and accompanying text.
79. See Gremillion v. Henderson, 425 F.2d 1293, 1294 (5th Cir. 1970); Ex parte Allen,
548 S.W.2d 905, 907 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Bennett v. State, 450 S.W.2d 652, 657 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1970).
80. See Parker v. Estelle, 498 F.2d 625, 627 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963
(1975); Bennett v. State, 450 S.W.2d 652, 657 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
81. See Bennett v. State, 450 S.W.2d 652, 657 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
82. See Robinson v. Beto, 426 F.2d 797, 798 (5th Cir. 1970).
83. See Ex parte Allen, 548 S.W.2d 905, 907 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (pre-sentence credit
formerly discretionary); TEX. CODE CRIM. Po. ANN. art. 42.03, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977)
(pre-sentence credit now mandatory).
84. Bennett v. State, 450 S.W.2d 652, 657 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
85. Caraway v. State, 550 S.W.2d 699, 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Ex parte Esquivel,
531 S.W.2d 339, 340 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
86. Ex parte Enriquez, 490 S.W.2d 546, 547 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
87. Ex parte Freeman, 486 S.W.2d 556, 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). See also Robinson
v. Beto, 426 F.2d 797, 798 (5th Cir. 1970).
. 88. See Pruett v. Texas, 470 F.2d 1182, 1184 (5th Cir.), aff'd, 414 U.S. 802 (1973) (good
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Multiple Jurisdictions
Frequently, a prisoner may already be in the custody of another jurisdiction when a conviction is obtained against him. This situation can occur
when several offenses arise out of the same criminal episode or when the
prisoner has committed more than one unrelated crime. In such cases, the
Texas courts have held that when multiple sentences in different prosecutions are not expressly made consecutive; they are automatically made
concurrent.' Section two of article 42.09 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure provides that a sentence "begins to run on the day it is pronounced." 0 This provision has been construed to give the prisoner flat time
credit from the day sentence is pronounced, no matter where the defendant

is in custody." The defendant is considered to be in the "constructive
custody" of the State of Texas.'"
"Constructive custody" may attach prior to sentencing in some instan-

ces.'" If the prisoner is in custody in one jurisdiction, and another jurisdiction places a detainer upon him, "constructive custody" begins at the time
the detainer is issued.." The defendant will, therefore, receive flat time
time credit pending appeal; prospective effect); Kane v. Texas, 388 F. Supp. 1188, 1189 (S.D.
Tex. 1975) (good time credit pending appeal; retroactive effect due to unique circumstances);
Harrelson v. State, 511 S.W.2d 957, 958 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (pre-sentence credit; prospective effect).
89. See Ex parte Downey, 471 S.W.2d 576, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); Ex parte Reynolds, 462 S.W.2d 605, 606 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
90. Tzx. CODE CaIUM. PRO. ANN. art. 42.09, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977).
91. See, e.g., Ex parte Williams, 551 S.W.2d 416, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (federal
prison); Ex parte Jasper, 538 S.W.2d 782, 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (Louisiana prison); Ex
parte Iglehart, 535 S.W.2d 185, 187 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (federal prison). The federal
statutes provide that the prisoner should receive credit for any days spent in custody "in
connection with the offense for which the sentence was imposed." 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1970)
(emphasis added). A prisoner will not receive credit on his federal sentence unless he is
actually in custody of the United States for the offense in question. See United States v.
Williams, 487 F.2d 215 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 942 (1973).
92. See Ex parteWilliams, 551 S.W.2d 416, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Ex parte Jasper,
538 S.W.2d 782, 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). There are some early Texas cases holding that
a prisoner who is convicted and imprisoned in another jurisdiction while on parole or after
escape from Texas is not entitled to credit on his Texas sentence while serving time in the
other jurisdiction. See, e.g., Ex parte Spears, 154 Tex. Crim. 112, 114, 235 S.W.2d 917, 918
(1950); Ex parte Jones, 152 Tex. Crim. 346, 348, 214 S.W.2d 123, 124 (1948); Ex parte Drake,
151 Tex. Crim. 17, 20, 205 S.W.2d 372, 374 (1947). It may be reasonable to conclude that if
the situation were to arise today, the court of criminal appeals would allow credit from the
time a detainer was placed on the prisoner, reasoning that the prisoner was in the
"constructive custody" of the State of Texas. See Ex parte Jasper, 538 S.W.2d 782, 784 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1976); Ex parte Spates, 521 S.W.2d 265, 266 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
93. See Ex parte Jasper, 538 S.W.2d 782, 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Ex parte Spates,
521 S.W.2d 265, 266 (1975). Spates involved a probation revocation proceeding. Under the
Texas deferred sentencing procedure, a probationer is not sentenced until probation is revoked. See Tzx. CODE CaM. Pao. ANN art. 42.12, § 3d(b) (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977).
94. Ex parte Jasper, 538 S.W.2d 782, 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
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credit beginning on the date the detainer is filed.95 On the other hand, if a
court with a pending case against a prisoner being held in another jurisdiction on another charge does not place a detainer on him, the prisoner will
receive no credit." The court of criminal appeals has reasoned that presentence credit depends on the prisoner's being held in jail on the conviction in question-constructive custody and commencement of credit depend on some type of hold being placed on the prisoner so that he cannot
be released inadvertently. 7
Since the issuance of a detainer apparently has been left to the discretion
of local authorities, a possible equal protection problem arises." Under the
requirements of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,
disparity in treatment of prisoners can only be justified by a "legitimate,
articulated state purpose."99 If the disparate treatment is based solely upon
the arbitrary or negligent failure of a district attorney to issue a detainer
for a prisoner, resulting in one prisoner's receiving credit while another
does not, then, it appears, the equal protection clause will not have been
satisfied. It is quite possible, however, that a finding of gross negligence
on the part of the officials in question would be required before the court
of criminal appeals would allow credit even though no detainer had been
filed.'"
The typical detainer is an informal document in which one law enforcement or corrections officer asks another to notify him when the wanted man is to be released so that
he may be on hand to pick him up and return him to the requesting jurisdiction to
answer a formal charge or even an informal accusation.
H. KERPER &J. KEkPER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE CONVICTED 478 (1974). See also TEX. CODE CRIM.
PRo. ANN. art. 51.14 (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977) (Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act).
Within Texas, a detainer may be effected by issuance of a capias. See Ex parte Spates, 521

S.W.2d.265, 266 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975);

TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN.

art. 23.01-.18 (Vernon

1966 & Supp. 1976-1977).
95. See Ex parte Jasper, 538 S.W.2d 782, 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Ex parte Spates,
521 S.W.2d 265, 266 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
96. Ex parte Alvarez, 519 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
97. Id. at 443.
98. Compare Ex parte Alvarez, 519 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (no detainer)
with Ex parte Spates, 521 S.W.2d 265, 266 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (detainer). The court in
Spates distinguished Alvarez on the basis that in Alvarez no detainer was filed, while in
Spates one was filed. Neither opinion provides any satisfactory explanation for the filing of a
detainer in one case and not in the other.
99. See McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973). See also Berger, Equal Protection
and Criminal Sentencing: Legal Policy Considerations, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 29, 56 (1976);
Schornhorst, Presentence Confinement and the Constitution: The Burial of Dead Time, 23
HASTINGS L.J. 1041, 1084-86 (1972); Note, Detainersand the CorrectionalProcess, 1966 WASH.
U.L.Q. 417.
100. Cf. Piper v. Estelle, 485 F.2d 245, 246 (5th Cir. 1973) (gross negligence required for
waiver of jurisdiction in premature release cases). Although there may be some lapse of time
before a detainer is issued for a defendant, the delay cannot be indefinite. A prisoner still
retains his right to a speedy trial, even though he is in custody of another jurisdiction on an
unrelated charge. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 383 (1969).
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Once a prisoner is in the "constructive custody" of the State of Texas,
he may also receive consideration for good time credits. 0' The allowance
of good time credit for time spent in another jurisdiction is a fairly recent
development in Texas law." 2 Formerly, good time credit could not be
earned on a Texas sentence while a prisoner was incarcerated in another
jurisdiction;'0 the courts holding that the purpose of good time credits was
to promote good behavior in Texas prisons."' In Ex parte Jasper,101however, the court of criminal appeals interpreted the new statute to require
good time credit for all time spent in custody, regardless of where the
detention occurred.' In another recent case, the court did not rely on the
new statute, but held that in view of "efficient modern communications"
there was no reason to deny such a prisoner consideration for good time
1
credits. 07
The court of criminal appeals used different reasoning in these
two cases to reach the same result-consideration for good time credits
earned in another jurisdiction will now be allowed.'
Although the requirement that good time credit be awarded only for
time spent in a Texas prison has been abrogated, the actual allowance
of the credit still lies within the discretion of the Texas Department of
Corrections after a review of the prisoner's conduct in the other jurisdiction.'" Additionally, the prisoner must be in the actual, physical custody of the Department of Corrections before such credit will be given."0
CONCLUSION

The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure now provides that flat time and
consideration for good time credit be mandatory for all time spent in
custody on a particular offense."' A few areas, however, remain unclear.
When a prisoner is prematurely released, for instance, allowance of time
credits will depend on whether or not the release was due to his own fault.12
The critical question in each case is the determination of what constitutes
101. Ex parte Williams, 551 S.W.2d 416, 418 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Ex parte Jasper,
538 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
102. See Ex parte Jasper, 538 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
103. See Holtzinger v. Estelle, 488.F.2d 517, 518 (5th Cir. 1974); Mills v. Beto, 477 F.2d
124, 125 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 414 U.S, 1005 (1973).
104. See Holtzinger v. Estelle, 488 F.2d 517, 518 (5th Cir. 1974).
105. 538 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
106. Id. at 785.
107. Ex parte Williams, 551 S.W.2d 416, 418 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
108. Compare Ex parte Jasper, 538 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) with Ex
parte Williams, 551 S.W.2d 416, 418 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
109. See Ex parte Vasquez, 553 S.W.2d 383, 384 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Ex parte
Williams, 551 S.W.2d 416, 418 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
110. Ex parte Williams, 551 S.W.2d 416, 418 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
111. TEX. CODE CRIM. Po. ANN. art. 42.03 (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977).
112. See Ex parte Downey, 471 S.W.2d 576, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971)..

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol9/iss3/9

14

Becker: Calculation of Time Credits for Texas Prisoners.

1978]

COMMENTS

555

"fault." Potential problems also exist when a prisoner has cases pending
in more than one jurisdiction. In such instances, credit will depend on
whether a detainer has been issued."' It is in this area that serious constitutional questions are raised. When given the opportunity, the court of
criminal appeals should provide a more definite framework for the determination of credit on multiple offenses.
113. Compare Ex parte Alvarez, 519 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (no detainer) with Ex parte Spates, 521 S.W.2d 265, 266 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (detainer).
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